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NOTE
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
COURTS:
WILL THE LEGAL PROCRASTINATION END?
In its recent decision, American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v.
Meese,' the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California
addressed two important issues bearing on the applicability of interna-
tional law in domestic courts. These are the role of treaty obligations in
creating justiciable rights for individuals, and the applicability of cus-
tomary international law in the face of a conflicting federal statute.
On a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' international law claims, the
court held that Article I of the Geneva Convention does not provide a
right of temporary refuge to Salvadorans and Guatemalans entering
the United States to avoid armed conflict in their home countries.2 The
court further found that customary rules of international law do not
override duly enacted federal statutes and that, therefore, a showing
that temporary refuge has become a customary norm will not provide a
right to refuge where federal statutory law denies this right.'
This note will argue that, while the court's reasoning regarding the
applicability of treaties in domestic courts is sound, its rationale for
denying the plaintiffs' customary international law claim is flawed.
Though the court relies on legitimate case law, it will be shown that
several early judicial misconstructions have resulted in a series of cases
that perhaps fail to accord customary international law its proper place
in the domestic arena. It will be argued that, rather than being a set-
tled matter, this question is one which requires further clarification
from the highest Court.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For many years, both El Salvador and Guatemala have suffered
the tragedy of internal armed conflict." As a result, large numbers of
1. 712 F.Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
2. Id. at 770.
3. Id. at 771.
4. For over a decade, Guatemalans have been caught in the cross-fire between
the Guatemalan Army and counter-insurgents. Between 1978 and 1983, 440 villages
were destroyed, 50,000 to 75,000 people either disappeared or were killed, and as many
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Salvadorans and Guatemalans have been both internally and externally
displaced through efforts to escape the political turmoil in their home-
lands.5 Many of them have attempted to seek refuge in the United
States. Of the refugees seeking political asylum in the United States,
fewer than three percent of the Salvadorans and fewer than one per-
cent of the Guatemalans have been granted asylum.6
In response to these circumstances, a number of organizations
have formed to assist Central American refugees in this country. In
addition, what has come to be known as the "sanctuary movement" (a
group who, under religious auspices, functions in a manner similar to
the nineteenth century's Underground Railroad) has arisen to aid this
same group in entering and remaining in the United States.7
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese8 (hereinafter
referred to as American Baptist Churches) involved a suit brought by
several refugee organizations, two individual undocumented aliens and
four religious organizations participating in the sanctuary movement.
The plaintiffs sought an injunction barring the arrest and deportation
of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees; and an injunction against the
prosecution of workers in the sanctuary movement whose acts were per-
formed prior to November 6, 1986.1 The grounds upon which relief was
sought included infringement of the free exercise of religion, violation
of international law and the discriminatory application of immigration
laws in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.'"
The plaintiffs' international law claim was based on two argu-
ments, namely, that a failure to grant temporary refuge was a violation
as 200,000 children were orphaned. Schirmer, Waging War To Prevent War, THE NA-
TION, Apr. 10, 1989, at 478, 479. In El Salvador, more than 60,000 people have been
killed during nine years of fighting between guerrillas and government forces. In the
first half of 1988, 39 civilians were executed by right-wing death squads. In the first
half of 1989, this number rose to 55. During the first six months of 1988, guerrillas
killed a reported 27 civilians (not including casualties resulting from land mines placed
by the guerrilla forces). Lane, Death's Democracy, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.
1989, at 18.
5. See Hartman and Perluss, Temporary Refuge. Emergence of a Customary
Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 567(1986).
6. 712 F.Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
7. See, e.g., A. CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE
AND THE LAW IN COLLUSION (1988).
8. 712 F.Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
9. On this date, Congress amended 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982), the criminal har-
boring and transporting statute. Under the amended statute, employers rather than
sanctuaries are targeted for prosecution and, in fact, since the new law was enacted, no
sanctuaries or members of sanctuary movements have been prosecuted. Id. at 761.
10. American Baptist Churches, 712 F.Supp. at 759.
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of the Geneva Convention and that such a failure was a violation of
customary international law." In adjudicating the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, the court held that the Geneva Convention pro-
vided no basis for the relief sought by the plaintiffs. 2 Further, the
court held that customary international law was not applicable since
the Refugee Act of 1980"s rejects a right of temporary refuge and this
explicit legislative act overrides customary international law."
The court, however, declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim that
discriminatory application of immigration laws governing the granting
of political asylum and the withholding of deportation could constitute
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 5
II. SUMMARY OF REASONING
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land. . . .."' Thus, treaties are accepted as being
equivalent, hierarchically, to a federal legislative act.' A distinction
has long been made, however, between treaty provisions which confer
rights directly and those which require that implementing legislation be
enacted domestically before rights are created. 8 The courts have held
that these latter, non-self-executing treaties do not, in the absence of
the required implementing legislation, provide a basis for a private
lawsuit. 19
In determining whether a treaty is self-executing, the courts have
relied on a number of factors set forth in previous case law. 20 These
11. Id. at 767.
12. Id. at 769-770.
13. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
14. 712 F.Supp. at 767-68.
15. Id. at 773-74.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
17. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S.(2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
18. 27 U.S.(2 Pet.) at 314.
19. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373
(7th Cir. 1985).
20. Factors to be considered in determining the intent of the parties to the treaty
include:
(1) the language and purpose of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances
surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agree-
ment; (4) the availability and feasibility of enforcement mechanisms; (5) the im-
plications of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the capacity of the judici-
1990]
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factors essentially look to the language, circumstances and nature of
the obligations agreed to in characterizing the treaty.2 1 The court in
American Baptist Churches, by applying these factors, determined that
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention,22 on which the plaintiffs relied, is
not self-executing and that, therefore, no rights can arise from this pro-
vision unless authorized by an implementing federal statute.23
The plaintiffs' claim that a right to temporary refuge is mandated
by customary international law2 4 was examined by the court in light of
the leading Supreme Court case, The Paquete Habana.25 In an oft-
quoted passage, the Court, in that case, stated that "[i]nternational law
is part of our law, and. . .where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to
the customs and usages of civilized nations . .. 2
The district court, in American Baptist Churches, found that the
enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to bring the
United States into full compliance with its obligations under interna-
tional law.2 7 Relying on The Paquete Habana, the court held that the
Refugee Act constituted a "controlling legislative act" and that, thus,
customary international law was inapplicable.28 The claim based on
customary international law, therefore, was dismissed. The issue of
ary to resolve the dispute.
Id. See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-810 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-
77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). In addition, if the intent of the parties
is clear from the language of the treaty, it has been held that the reviewing court need
not consider additional factors. Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 918 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
21. 761 F.2d at 373.
22. Article I of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 states that, "The High Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and to insure respect for the present Convention in all circum-
stances." The plaintiffs relied on this Article by arguing that the deportation of
Salvadorans and Guatemalans to countries where violations of other, non-applicable
Articles are taking place is itself a violation of Article 1. Specifically, they argued that
Article 3, which provides that certain protections be afforded to civilians during non-
international conflicts, is being continually violated in El Salvador and Guatemala. Ar-
ticle 3, however, only governs the behavior of parties to the armed conflict and thus
does not implicate the actions of the United States directly. American Baptist
Churches, 712 F.Supp. 756, 769 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
23. 712 F.Supp. at 770.
24. Id. at 770-71.
25. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
26. Id. at 700.
27. 712 F.Supp. at 771.
28. Id.
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whether a right of temporary refuge exists as a customary norm was
not addressed since the court considered the point moot. 9
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the Equal Protection Clause was
violated by the defendants' discriminatory application of the Refugee
Act.30 The court divided its discussion of this claim into two distinct
issues. The first issue was the defendants' failure to grant extended vol-
untary departure (EVD) -an extra-statutory grant by the Attorney
General which temporarily suspends the deportation of all aliens of a
particular nationality. 31 A number of cases in the circuit courts were
cited by this court supporting the implication that "a governmental pol-
icy that makes nationality-based distinctions should at least be re-
viewed for equal protection violations."32 In denying the defendants'
motion to dismiss this claim, the court held that a determination must
be made as to the defendants' motive in denying EVD.33 If this motive
stemmed from a "discriminatory animus" rather than from foreign pol-
icy considerations, the court indicated that the action should be re-
viewed by a more stringent standard than the traditional rational rela-
tionship review. 3'
The second equal protection issue considered by the court was the
defendants' failure to grant either political asylum or the withholding
of deportation to individual Salvadorans or Guatemalans.35 The Refu-
gee Act allows a grant of asylum if an alien can prove a "well-founded
fear of persecution". 36 Alternatively, an alien may be eligible for with-
29. Id. at 770-71.
30. The court quoted the plaintiffs' complaint as follows:
Defendants engage in a practice of generally granting asylum, refugee status, ex-
tended voluntary departure or other relief providing refuge to persons who are
fleeing unrest or disorder in countries they consider "Communist" or dominated by
the Soviet Union. ... At the same time, persons fleeing El Salvador and Guate-
mala are denied the right to even temporary refuge in the United States because
the governments of those countries are considered to be political allies of the
United States.
Id. at 772.
31. Id. at 768. Granting extended voluntary departure is entirely within the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General. No codified standards exist for the granting or with-
holding of this protection.
32. Id. at 772. The court cited as precedent Shahla v. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, 749 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1984); Ghajar v. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service, 652 F.2d 1347, 1349 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618
F.2d 1356, 1362-63 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1980). See 712 F.Supp. at 772-73.
33. 712 F.Supp. at 773.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) authorizes the granting of asylum to those who
1990]
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holding of deportation on the showing of a "clear probability of perse-
cution" upon his or her return to the country of origin."' In reviewing
the statutory standards for both forms of relief, the court concluded
that:
[I]t would appear [that]. . .Congress has instructed the Executive that
nationality may not be considered when applying section 208(a) of the
Refugee Act and section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The Executive's allegedly chronic failure to abide by its Congres-
sional mandate could constitute a denial of the equal protection of the
laws.38
The motion to dismiss this claim, therefore, was denied.
The court also addressed claims that the defendants' actions con-
stituted infringement of religious freedoms with respect to the sanctu-
ary movement39 , and that deportation to a dangerous locale constituted
reckless endangerment 0 . Both of these claims were dismissed by the
court. "' The court's reasoning in arriving at these conclusions will not
be discussed as these issues do not bear directly on the topic of interna-
tional law.
III. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. General History
A discussion of the role of international law in United States
courts must begin with a review of the nature and development of the
international legal system.
International law is defined as "the law which regulates the rela-
tionships of nations to each other."4 Its roots grew from the inevitable
need for a method of settling disputes among independent nation-states.
By the 1600's, when such states began to emerge, a burgeoning flow of
trade between states and improvements in navigation had led to a need
to systematize the growing body of custom, usage and practice gov-
erning inter-state relations.
meet the "well-founded fear" standard articulated in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(1982).
37. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984).
Withholding of deportation is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982).
38. 712 F.Supp. at 774.
39. Id. at 762-64.
40. Id. at 774-75.
41. Id. at 764, 774-75.
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (5th ed. 1983).
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One of the earliest definitive attempts to characterize international
law was made by Hugo Grotius in his treatise entitled De Jure Belli Ac
Pacis."s It was in this important work that Grotius proposed the theory
that international customs, treaties and practice were subject to review
against the tenets of natural law." The natural law philosophy teaches
that principles of natural law are derived from universal reason and,
therefore, must govern any legal system." 5
By the end of the eighteenth century, the theory of natural law
had been at least partially supplanted by a positivist philosophy.46 The
positivist view, rather than assuming that reason should dictate law,
held that the practice of nations should principally define international
legal obligations.47 Natural law was relegated to a secondary role.
The modern era of international law was ushered in first by the
post-World War I League of Nations and then by the post-World War
II United Nations. Both institutions represented a trend away from the
concept of international law as a set of rules respecting the sovereignty
of nations, and toward a philosophy embodying an organized effort at
imposing mutual obligations for the betterment of all."' One very im-
portant result of this effort was the establishment of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) as a neutral forum for the judicial resolution of
disputes between States. 9 The ICJ represents the current, definitive
authority on issues of international law in the international forum. In
keeping with the evolution of the natural law and positivist theories of
43. L. HENKIN, R.C. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxxvi (2nd ed. 1987).
44. Id. at xxxvii.
45. Id.
46. Id. at x-xxviii.
47. Id.
48. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, par. 1-3. The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and . . .to take effective collec-
tive measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means . . .adjustment or settlement of international
disputes...
2. To develop friendly relations among nations...
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an eco-
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and in promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms...
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. Prior to the establishment of the ICJ and its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, international law had
been applied by national courts in actions arising from disputes of an international
nature. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.(2 DalI.) 419 (1793); Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S.(3 DalI.) 199 (1796).
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international law, the ICJ determines applicable law by looking for au-
thority to:
(a)international conventions. . .establishing rules expressly recog-
nized by the contesting states;
(b)international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
(c)the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d). . .judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law."0
B. International Law in U.S. Courts
At the time of the American Revolution, increased international
trade and colonization of the New World had made international law
and its application an issue of obvious daily importance. The Founding
Fathers recognized this fact by including treaties along with the Con-
stitution and federal laws as "the supreme Law of the Land".51 The
Constitution is silent, however, as to the role of customary international
law and the hierarchy of application between treaties and the other
elements listed in the Supremacy Clause. These issues have largely
been left to the discretion of the federal courts.
1. The Role of Treaties
The issue of priority of application where a treaty and a subse-
quent statute conflict has been resolved by the adoption of what is
known as the "last in time" doctrine. This theory derives from the fact
that the Supremacy Clause, by its wording, affords equal weight to
both treaties and federal statutes. 5 As the Supreme Court stated in
Whitney v. Robertson,
Congress may modify such provisions so far as they bind the
United States, or supersede them altogether. By the Constitution, a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation,
with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to
be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to
either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the
50. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3
Bevans 1179, Art. 38.
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
52. Id. The full text of the Supremacy Clause appears in text accompanying
n. 16.
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courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either;
but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in time will control the
other. . .
Thus, the Court provided what is essentially a two-part test for the
applicability of this doctrine. The first part requires that the judiciary
determine whether a conflict actually exists when the two provisions are
read in their most consistent light. Only if the two cannot be reconciled
should the court apply the last in time doctrine.
A further requirement which has been imposed by the Court is
that the treaty must be self-executing. This was rationalized by the
Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion
Case) as follows:
A treaty, it is true, is in its nature a contract between nations and
is often merely promissory in its character, requiring legislation to
carry its stipulations into effect. Such legislation will be open to
future repeal or amendment. If the treaty operates by its own force,
and relates to a subject within the power of Congress, it can be
deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a legislative act, to
be repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress. In either case
the last expression of the sovereign will must control. 4
Clarification of the factors to be used in determining whether a
treaty is self-executing has been provided by the Seventh Circuit Court
in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.55 The essential ele-
ment of the test is a determination of the parties' intent to provide
specific, discernible rights and obligations as a result of the conclusion
of the instrument. Where this element is lacking and the treaty is, in
the words of the Court, "merely promissory"5 , the treaty is non-self-
executing.
In summary, the current standard for determining the applicabil-
ity of a treaty which appears to conflict with a federal statute requires
that the last in time doctrine be given force. The court, however, must
first determine that the two conflicting provisions cannot reasonably be
interpreted as consistent, and that the treaty provision is self-executing.
53. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
54. 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
55. See supra notes 19, 20.
56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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2. The Role of Customary International Law
The role of customary international law in United States courts
has likewise evolved through federal court decisions. As was discussed
previously, custom, from the inception of a body of international law,
played a role in defining the duties and obligations of nations.57 Refer-
ences to the United States' duty to uphold customary international law
(or the law of nations), can be found in cases dating as early as 1793 at
which time the Supreme Court stated that
.. .the United States had, by taking a place among the nations of
the earth, become amenable to the law of nations; and it was their
interest as well as their duty to provide, that those laws should be
respected and obeyed; in their national character and capacity, the
United States were responsible to foreign nations for the conduct of
each State, relative to the laws of nations and the performance of
treaties. 58
In 1796, the Court reiterated this position in Ware v. Hylton.59
There, the Court stated that "when the United States declared their
independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modern state of purity and refinement."60 The importance of customary
international law was further underscored by the Court in Brown v.
United States when it asked the question, "[d]oes it comport with the
interest and character of this government, to reject principles and us-
ages, calculated to ameliorate and mitigate the state of war and to pro-
mote the interest of commerce, which it appears have been cheerfully
adopted by all the monarchies of Europe?"'"
Later still, in 1886, the Court, in a counterfeiting case, explained
that
The law of nations requires every national government to use "due
57. For a general discussion of the role of custom as a source of law in the
international arena, see supra pp. 7-9. On the international plane, it is conceded
that customary law, defined as customs accepted by all or a majority of nations as
legally binding, is enforceable subject to one exception. That exception is where a
State, during the formation of the custom unambiguously and persistently objected
to the recognition of the practice as law. See HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMIT,
supra note 43, at 64.
58. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 474 (1793).
59. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796).
60. Id. at 281.
61. 12 U.S.(8 Cranch) 109, 112 (1814).
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diligence" to prevent a wrong from being done within its own do-
minion to another nation with which it is at peace, or to the people
thereof; and because of this the obligation of one nation to punish
those who within its own jurisdiction counterfeit the money of an-
other nation has long been recognized.62
By the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, the courts had
repeatedly indicated that customary international law was binding
upon the federal government. The limits of its applicability, however,
were not explored until the Supreme Court addressed the issue in the
watershed case, The Paquete Habana.6" Here, the Court stated
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. '4
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied upon the holding of a
previous case, Hilton v. Guyot (hereinafter referred to as Hilton).6" In
Hilton, the Court held that, in cases requiring the ascertainment of
applicable international law,
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions
is a treaty or a statute of this country. But when, as is the case
here, there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests
upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the
law is. . . .In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they
can from judicial decisions [and]. . .the acts and usages of civilized
nations.66
Since the Paquete Habana decision, a number of courts have cited
the quoted passage as precedent for the proposition that customary in-
ternational law is subservient in domestic courts to treaties and federal
statutes. For example, in Tag v. Rogers the Court of Appeals stated
that "it has long been settled. . .that the federal courts are bound to
62. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1886).
63. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
64. Id. at 700.
65. 159 U.S. 113 (1894).
66. Id. at 163.
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recognize [applicable treaties, statutes, or constitutional provisions] as
superior to canons of international law."67
A further judicially imposed limitation on the applicability of cus-
tomary international law came with the Supreme Court's decision in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.18 Although the Court cautioned
that its holding was to be narrowly construed, its conclusion that the
Act of State doctrine superseded customary international law in cases
involving the taking of property within the United States by a foreign
sovereign nonetheless represented a further judicial narrowing of the
role of customary law.69 The significance of this holding, however, was
negated by the passage of the Second Hickenlooper Amendment which
effectively overturned the Court's holding."
Though the general trend with regard to customary international
law has been to reduce the scope of its applicability in U.S. courts, two
recent cases have demonstrated that it is still a viable source of law in
certain circumstances. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala1 the court allowed a
suit to be brought against a Paraguayan police officer for the torture
and murder of a young Paraguayan. Jurisdiction for the suit was de-
rived from the Alien Tort Statute which provides a cause of action in
district courts for torts committed "in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States". 72 The court held that "an act of torture
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates es-
tablished norms of the international law of human rights, and hence
the law of nations."73 In making this determination, the court looked to
such sources as the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human
67. 267 F.2d 664, 666 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960).
68. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
69. Id. at 428. The Act of State doctrine is described as follows:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by rea-
son of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 416, quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 258 (1897).
70. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)(1964). The Second Hickenlooper Amendment
forbids U.S. courts from declining to hear cases involving confiscation of property by
foreign sovereigns unless either the act of that sovereign is not in violation of interna-
tional law, or the Executive requests the application of the Act of State doctrine for
foreign policy reasons.
71. 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1980) which provides in full that "[tihe district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
73. 630 F.2d at 880.
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Rights74' , the prohibition of torture in numerous treaties, and the prohi-
bition of torture in State constitutions.
Yet another case in which customary international law has been
applied by a federal court is Fernandez v. Wilkinson.7 ' Here, the court
held that "indeterminate detention in a maximum security prison of
excluded aliens who have not been convicted of a crime in this country
or found to be a security risk is arbitrary . . 6 Citing many of the
same sources as the court had in Filartiga, this court determined that
"international law secures to petitioner the right to be free of arbitrary
detention and that his right is being violated. 7 7 Because the court con-
cluded that "perpetuating a state of affairs which results in the viola-
tion of. . .fundamental human rights is clearly an abuse of discretion",
it ordered the release of the petitioner . 8 Resort was had to interna-
tional law in this instance because both Constitutional protections and
existing statutes were held to be inapplicable to the circumstances.7 9
C. Immigration Statutes
Since customary international law has been judged to fill gaps left
by statutes and treaties, it is important at this juncture to review ex-
isting statutes governing immigration, and the cases which have inter-
preted this law.
A person seeking statutorily granted refuge in the United States
may do so either by applying for political asylum or by seeking the
withholding of deportation. Political asylum may be granted "in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines
that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section
1101 (a)(42)(A) of [the statute]."8 A refugee is therein defined in ac-
74. G.A. Res. 217 (III)(A)(1948).
75. 505 F.Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
76. Id. at 794.
77. Id. at 795.
78. Id. at 799.
79. Previous federal court decisions have held that the 5th and 8th Amendments
do not extend protection to excluded or excludable aliens. See, e.g., Mir, et al v. Wil-
kinson, 80-3139 (D. Kan., Sept. 2, 1980, unpublished); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
344 U.S. 590 (1953), citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945 concurring opinion);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). In addition, the existing statutes govern
only the exclusion and temporary detention of aliens who have applied for admission.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a); 1182(d)(5); 1225(b); 1227 (1982). Since the issue in Fernan-
dez v. Wilkinson is indefinite detention of a convicted criminal awaiting deportation
rather than temporary detention of applicants for admission, the petitioner falls into
what is essentially -a legal abyss.
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
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cordance with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees as
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion ... "
The withholding of deportation, on the other hand, must be
granted to any alien (with certain statutorily defined exceptions) "if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in [the country to which the alien would be deported] on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."182 The withholding of deportation, then, dif-
fers from the granting of political asylum in that the former, unlike the
latter, is granted where the defined standard is met. It is not a discre-
tionary grant. As is illustrated by the case law which has interpreted
this statute, however, the level of proof required for withholding of de-
portation is greater than that required for a grant of political asylum.
D. Case Law Interpreting the Immigration Statutes
The definitive case setting the standard for review of an applica-
tion for withholding of deportation is Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Stevic (hereinafter referred to as Stevic).83 Prior to the en-
actment of the Refugee Act of 1980,84 the Attorney General was au-
thorized to withhold deportation of an otherwise deportable alien if the
alien would be subject to persecution upon deportation. 85 In addition,
the Attorney General was authorized to permit conditional entry of ref-
ugees specifically from Communist-dominated states and the Middle
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42)(A) (1982). The U.N. Protocol, to which the U.S. ac-
ceded in 1968, bound all parties to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2
through 34 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982). Exceptions to § 1253(h)(1) are listed in §
1253(h)(2). These include aliens who have committed serious non-political crimes
((2)(c)) and aliens who present a danger to security ((2)(d)).
83. 467 U.S. 407(1983).
84. See supra note 13.
85. 467 U.S. at 414.
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East if racial, religious or political persecution was likely. 86 In the with-
holding of deportation, the standard for reviewing such cases was the
showing of "a clear probability of persecution" or a "likelihood of per-
secution."18 7 For conditional entry, the standard was a "good reason to
fear persecution. 88
The Supreme Court, in Stevic, found the Refugee Act of 1980 to
be designed primarily "to revise and regularize the procedures gov-
erning the admission of refugees."" The adoption of the United Na-
tions definition of the term "refugee" and the elimination of the geo-
graphic and ideological distinctions made in the previous statute were
intended to bring United States practice into line with the United Na-
tions Protocol. 90 In the Court's view, the intent of Congress was not
that every alien meeting the definition of "refugee" was entitled to
withholding of deportation, but rather that "the alien had to satisfy the
standard under 243(h)." 91 This standard, as had been determined by
previous case law, was proof of a clear probability of persecution which
the Court defined as "more likely than not that the alien would be
subject to persecution on one of the specified grounds."9 Thus, the
Refugee Act did not change the standard of proof required.
As is explicitly required by the previously quoted statute,93 for an
applicant to be eligible for political asylum, he or she must prove a
well-founded fear of persecution. This standard has been accepted as
more liberal than the clear probability test.94 A precise definition of
"well-founded fear" has eluded the courts. Several cases, however, pro-
vide guidance on the level of proof required.
In one case, the Fifth Circuit held that "[a]n alien possesses a
well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable person in her circum-
stances would fear persecution if she were to be returned to her native
country."95 The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue by requiring that
the petitioner provide "specific facts establishing that he or she has ac-
tually been the victim of persecution or has some other good reason to
86. Id. at 415, citing 8 U.S.C. § l153(a)(7)(A)(i)(1976 ed.).
87. See, e.g., Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967).
88. See In re Tan, 12 1. & N. Dec. 564, 569-570 (BIA 1967).
89. 467 U.S. at 425.
90. Id. at 426-427.
91. Id. at 428.
92. Id. at 429-430.
93. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. See e.g. 467 U.S. at 425; Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1468 (9th Cir.
1986); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1984).
95. Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
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fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution. . . ."I" A two-
tier subjective/objective approach is used in applying these definitions.
The alien must first demonstrate a subjective fear, and then prove that
an adequate basis existed for the fear to be "well-founded.""
In contrast, proving a "clear probability" requires that there be a
"greater-than-fifty-percent chance of persecution." 98 Generalized evi-
dence of wide-spread violence will not suffice as proof. Evidence must
be provided showing that "(1) the applicant or those similarly situated
are at greater risk than the general population, and (2) that the threat
to the applicant is a serious one." 99
Agency action of this kind has been held to be subject to a narrow
standard of review. In Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, the
Supreme Court indicated that "a court is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. Nonetheless, the agency must examine the rele-
vant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action includ-
ing a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made."100
In addition to the granting of political asylum or the withholding
of deportation, a third type of relief is available to aliens under certain
circumstances. Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD) may be granted
to all aliens of a particular nationality if the Attorney General so
chooses. 101 Since this is, however, an extra-statutory form of relief
which is purely within the discretion of the Attorney General, any re-
view of a decision to grant or deny EVD is only subject to limited re-
view. As the court indicated in Narenji v. Civiletti, "[d]istinctions on
the basis of nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by the
Congress or the Executive. So long as such distinctions are not wholly
irrational they must be sustained.1 ° Thus, any challenge to such a
decision on the grounds of violation of the Equal Protection Clause
must meet an extremely high threshold of proof.
96. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)(emphasis in
original).
97. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 1452.
99. Id. citing Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (9th Cir.
1984).
100. 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). This holding is cited in Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627
F.Supp. 13, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
101. See supra note 31.
102. 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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IV. Analysis
As is clear from the reading of any number of early Supreme
Court cases, international law played a crucial role in the early devel-
opment of domestic law in the U.S. Having no other source of law from
which to glean guidance, the early U.S. courts would naturally look to
the law of nations and the law of various European nations.10 3 The Su-
preme Court, in fact, expressly embraced international law as part of
U.S. jurisprudence in two early decisions - Ware v. Hylton', and
Chisolm v. Georgia'0 5 In both cases, the Court argued that, by virtue
of having become an independent nation, the United States was bound
to accept and administer the law of nations." 6 Likewise, the incorpora-
tion of treaties into the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution points to
the intent of the Founding Fathers to give international law an impor-
tant place in U.S. law.
Later cases reinforced the view that international law was consid-
ered a viable and important part of domestic law at least as late as the
first part of the twentieth century. For example, in the case of Kansas
v. Colorado, the Supreme Court stated that
The clear language of the Constitution vests in this court the power
to settle [disputes between States]. . . Nor is our jurisdiction
ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are States sovereign
and independent in local matters, the relations between them de-
pend in any respect upon principles of international law. Interna-
tional law is no alien in this tribunal.0 7
A late nineteenth century case provides insight into the reason for this
broad acceptance. The Supreme Court held that the United States was
obligated to prosecute those who counterfeit the currency of another
country within its borders and explained
But if the United States can require this of another, that other may
103. See, e.g., Alexander Murray, Esq. v. The Schooner Charming Betsy ("The
Charming Betsy"), 6 U.S.(2 Cranch) 64 (1804), citing British court decisions and the
law of nations in deciding a case concerning seizure of a commercial ship by a U.S.
ship of war.
104. 3 U.S.(3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
105. 2 U.S.(2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
106. See supra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text.
107. 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1906). See also Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424
(1901), citing British and international law to determine duties of the U.S. regarding a
deserting Russian soldier.
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require it of them, because international obligations are of necessity
reciprocal in their nature. The right, if it exists at all, is given by
the law of nations, and what is law for one is, under the same cir-
cumstances, law for the other. A right secured by the law of na-
tions to a nation, or its people, is one the United States as the rep-
resentatives of this nation are bound to protect.
108
It is an obligation of reciprocity, then, which early jurists felt re-
quired the United States to embrace international law. This is fully in
accord with the treatment which treaties have historically been af-
forded. A treaty, like a contract, is entered into when two or more par-
ties wish to secure certain promised behavior (or lack thereof) and are
willing to reciprocate for the promise by offering something of rela-
tively equal value.
Thus, the place of treaties as a hallowed part of our laws is under-
standable. The nation's reputation rests in large part on its ability and
desire to fulfill specific obligations which it has, arguably, contracted to
undertake. To the Founding Fathers, presiding nervously over a
fledgling nation with an uncertain future, the need to build and main-
tain that reputation would have seemed quite urgent.
Viewed in this context, the last in time doctrine also makes sense.
By the time the Supreme Court espoused this principle in 1888,109 the
independence of the nation was well-established so that the attention of
the courts could be turned more toward resolving internal legal con-
flicts. More than 100 years had passed since the nation began - more
than enough time for the problems of outdated treaty obligations and
changing international circumstances to have come to the fore. The
Court's pronouncement on this point was unequivocal and its holding
was reasonable. If treaties, federal statutes and the Constitution are of
equal weight and the latter two can be amended through federal action,
then a mechanism must exist for amending a treaty at least with re-
spect to its application domestically.
Similarly, the line of cases explicating the principle that treaties
must be self-executing to override previous, conflicting legislation is
reasonable. If a treaty is "merely promissory" in nature, then, like a
contract provision which is too vague to define the rights and duties of
the contracting parties, it cannot be enforceable until its elements are
better defined. When non-self-executing treaties are viewed in this
light, it seems rational to consider that implementing legislation defines
108. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1886).
109. See supra n. 53 and accompanying text.
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the rights and obligations owed by the national government. Since this
legislation would not in any way differ from other federal enactments,
this latter statute (and not the treaty itself) would simply override the
previously enacted law.
By the foregoing reasoning, the holding of the court in American
Baptist Churches with regard to the applicability of the Geneva Con-
vention is sound.110 Article I of the Convention reads, "The High Con-
tracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the pre-
sent Convention in all circumstances.""" This language is clearly not
explicit enough to define any rights or obligations in a meaningful man-
ner; and thus cannot constitute a self-executing treaty provision.
The role of customary international law has evolved in a similar,
but less precise manner than that of treaties. As has been discussed
previously, the watershed case defining the role of customary interna-
tional law in domestic courts is The Paquete Habana."2 In this case,
the Supreme Court held that "where there is no treaty, and no control-
ling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had
to the customs and usages of civilized nations .. ."'I" The Court indi-
cated that it was relying for precedent on a previous case, Hilton v.
Guyot."' Its holding differs from that of Hilton, however, in several
significant aspects.
The Court in Hilton rather pointedly indicated that international
law applies not only to controversies between nations, "but also [to]
questions arising under what is usually called private international
law. . .and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and
dominion of one nation. "15 This emphasis on applicability to pri-
vate rights among individuals is missing in The Paquete Habana.
Additionally, the Court in Hilton indicated that where no treaty or
statute exists, the court must resort to judicial decisions and the acts
and usages of nations. " 6 Thus, this Court places judicial decisions on
par with custom rather than on par with treaties and statutes, as The
Paquete Habana does. More importantly, however, the Court in Hilton
interjected its discussion with the statement, "[blut when, as is the case
110. 712 F.Supp. 756, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
111. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War of August 12, 1949, art. I, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
112. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
113. Id. at 700.
114. 159 U.S. 113 (1894).
115. Id. at 163.
116. Id.
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here, there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon
the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law
is .... 11117 No such language appears in The Paquete Habana. The
clear implication of this phraseology is that courts are being instructed
not to find an issue nonjusticiable merely because no "written law" can
be found on the subject. To assume, however, that a hierarchy of appli-
cation is being established, as has been argued by scholars with regard
to the language of The Paquete Habana, is unwarranted.
Subsequent to the decision in The Paquete Habana, several courts
accepted this hierarchical interpretation and held that customary inter-
national law was superseded by a conflicting treaty or statute.118 This
raises two important questions, however. The first is whether The Pa-
quete Habana was intended to relegate customary law to a secondary
role; the second is the significance of the "judicial decisions" alluded to
in both The Paquete Habana and Hilton v. Guyot.
Although the court in American Baptist Churches apparently feels
otherwise,119 the language of The Paquete Habana decision is by no
means entirely unambiguous. The Paquete Habana could be inter-
preted as giving treaties and statutes precedence over customary law;
however, it could just as easily be read as a narrow holding based on
the specific facts of the case - namely an instance where an issue of
international law had arisen but no treaty or statute addressing the
question existed. This second interpretation is all the more reasonable
when The Paquete Habana is viewed in light of the earlier Hilton v.
Guyot opinion which exhorted courts to fulfill their duty to adjudicate
an issue where precisely such a void exists. Furthermore, although the
holding requires the application of customary law under the circum-
stances existing in The Paquete Habana, this does not necessarily im-
ply that the Court intended to preclude its application under other cir-
cumstances (e.g. where a conflicting treaty does exist). In any event,
the Court did not expressly hold that where a conflict exists between a
customary international norm and a treaty or statute, the custom must
yield; and because the Supreme Court has not subsequently addressed
the issue, the question remains open.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., supra note 67. See also Committee of U.S. Citizens In Nicaragua
v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
119. American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756, 771
(N.D. Cal. 1989). Citing The Paquete Habana, the court said, "The Supreme Court's
early cases involving the concept of customary international law make clear that 'it
applies only in the absence of any treaty or other public act... in relation to the
matter.' "
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As to the role of judicial decisions in these instances, this has not
been clarified by subsequent case law and, thus, remains something of a
mystery. In any court, past precedent will have some persuasive value,
so why did the authors of The Paquete Habana and Hilton v. Guyot
trouble themselves to include this obvious source of law? Especially
troublesome is the question of why it was included in the former opin-
ion on what appeared to be the same plane as treaties and statutes.
This surely was not intended to imply that past precedent was to be
interpreted as of equivalent stature with these other two sources. One
theory which makes sense in this context is that, as was previously pos-
tulated, the authors in these cases intended that future courts, when
faced with questions of international law, should look to whichever of
the enumerated sources was able to provide guidance. It may well be
that the authors meant to say no more than the literal meaning of their
words, namely that customary international law was to be regarded as
a legitimate source of law along with treaties, statutes and judicial
precedent.
The theory that customary international law may not be automati-
cally superseded by statutes or treaties also is leant credence when
viewed in the overall context of international wrongs and the necessity
to provide a forum for the relief of such injuries. As was stated in
Hilton v. Guyot, international law must be viewed, not as limited to
relations between nations, but as encompassing wrongs between parties
of different nationalities.1"' Examined from this perspective, it seems
clear that a wrong stemming from a violation of customary law must
be allowed a forum just as a wrong stemming from the violation of a
treaty is. If the federal judiciary chooses to ignore treaties in domestic
courts, this does not preclude a cause of action on the part of the con-
tracting party. A forum exists to redress such a grievance (the Interna-
tional Court of Justice). Since the ICJ only entertains suits brought
between nations, a private individual would have no forum for his suit
in the event that a statute precluded a cause of action based on a viola-
tion of customary law.121
120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
121. While the U.S. government could, if it chose to do so, represent an individ-
ual before the ICJ, this is far less likely in the event of a violation of custom than in the
event of the violation of a treaty. Since a treaty is concluded between nations, a viola-
tion of a treaty in force is a wrong against the nation itself. On the other hand, a wrong
resulting from a violation of custom may well be an injury solely to an individual. In
the case of a treaty, the injured nation, by having concluded the treaty, has made a
public policy statement regarding the substance of the agreement. If an individual citi-
zen has been wronged as a result of a violation of custom, however, his or her country
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From a public policy point of view, it is desirable that federal
courts entertain suits deriving from violations of customary interna-
tional law for precisely the reason set forth by the Court in United
States v. Arjonal" - namely that reciprocity among nations requires it.
The old maxim that in order to demand equity one must do equity
summarizes this argument. If one nation wishes to secure a forum for
its grievances and those of its citizens, it must supply a forum in appro-
priate circumstances to other nations. This is in keeping too with the
spirit of those very early Supreme Court cases which so readily em-
braced international law as part of our jurisprudence.123
Moreover, a review of cases which have cited The Paquete Ha-
bana illustrates that judicial interpretations of the Court's words differ
considerably. Although several of the lower federal courts have em-
braced the theory that customary international law must bow to an
inconsistent federal statute," 4 the reasoning of these courts in arriving
at this conclusion varies.
The D.C. Circuit in Tag v. Rogers accepts the constructionist view
that treaties, statutes and constitutional provisions are superior to cus-
tom because the syntactical structure of The Paquete Habana dictates
so. 1 '25 In supporting its finding, the court indicated that the last in time
doctrine dictates applicability where conflicting treaties and statutes
are concerned and that, further, "[wihen. . .a constitutional agency
adopts a policy contrary to a trend in international law or to a treaty or
prior statute, the courts must accept the latest act of that agency." 2'
This view, however, ignores the very basic difference between these
sources of law. A treaty or statute is essentially a policy statement or
promise made by a sovereign at a particular point in time. In contrast,
customary law is a principle which has evolved over time among the
nations of the world. By its nature, it is self-rejuvenating insofar as a
finding that a practice has risen to the level of custom is a finding that,
at this time, the consensus among nations is of a continuing, binding
may wish, for political reasons or for reasons of economic expediency, not to press the
issue.
122. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Committee of U.S.
Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Bell, 248
F.2d 992 (2nd Cir. 1918); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (2nd Cir. 1925); Zenith
Radio Corporation v. Matsushita, 494 F.Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980); U.S. v. Howard-
Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1982); U.S. v James-Robinson, 515 F.Supp. 1340 (S.D.
Fla. 1981).
125. 267 F.2d 664 at 666.
126. Id. at 668.
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norm. Attempting to apply a last in time doctrine, therefore, would
lead to the conclusion that as long as a given practice remained a cus-
tom, it would always be the last in time.
This issue was neatly circumvented by the Second Circuit in The
Over the Top where the court argued that custom is only binding "in so
far as we adopt it, and like all common or statute law it bends to the
will of Congress.1127 This argument, however, misstates the law. The
binding nature of customary law is not frustrated by a lack of active
acceptance. Rather, it is inapplicable only to those nations who during
the development of the custom, specifically and repeatedly opposed the
practice as a legally binding norm.'28 An overt rejection of the custom
after it had become widely accepted, therefore, would not suffice to free
a state from an obligation imposed by customary law.
Yet another rationale for the superiority of treaties and statutes
over customary international law has been proposed by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan."9 Here,
the court argued that such a hierarchy of application is implied by the
fact that statutes may override treaties, since abrogation of a treaty
violates customary international law.'30 Such reasoning is circuitous at
best. Abrogation of a treaty certainly does far greater violence to ac-
cepted treaty law than to customary law. In addition, the passage of a
statute whose provisions are contrary to those of a treaty does not nec-
essarily constitute an abrogation of that treaty. While such an act
might be sufficient to prove an anticipatory breach, a breach per se
would not occur until the government actually failed to fulfil the provi-
sions of the treaty when called upon to do so. Such a circumstance
might not arise for many years while, in the interim, additional legisla-
tion could be enacted which would bring the government back into
compliance.
The Supreme Court also has had occasion to quote The Paquete
Habana in cases involving questions of international law. In Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court, in a very narrow ruling, held
that the Act of State doctrine precluded adjudication of suits involving
the taking of property by a recognized sovereign nation within its own
borders even if the taking violates customary international law. 1 3' Al-
127. 5 F.2d 838, 842 (2nd Cir. 1925). This view has also been adopted by a
Pennsylvania district court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita, 494 F.Supp. 1161
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
128. See supra note 57.
129. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 939.
131. 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1963). This holding was subsequently overturned by
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though this holding seems to narrow the applicability of customary in-
ternational law in U.S. courts, the Court's reasoning provides insight
into the issue implicated in American Baptist Churches. In its opinion,
the Court states that ". . .[international law] establishes substantive
principles for determining whether one country has wronged an-
other. . .[however] the public law of nations can hardly dictate to a
country which is in theory wronged how to treat that wrong within its
domestic borders.'1 32 Thus, the Court was concerned with a very differ-
ent set of circumstances than that of refugees seeking political asylum
or the withholding of deportation. In the latter case, the injured party
is not the country in whose forum relief is sought. Presumably, this
implies that the Court might be less likely to narrow the application of
custom where the injury was borne by an outside party; perhaps be-
cause such a party would have had no opportunity to effect a remedy
through legislative or executive action.
The continuing vitality of international law as a legitimate source
for domestic application was reiterated by the Supreme Court in First
National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio, a case involving a set-
off claimed by a U.S. bank against a Cuban quasi-governmental credit
institution. 3' Here, although no overt conflict existed between interna-
tional law and federal law, the Court nonetheless stated that ". . .in-
ternational law. . .as we have frequently reiterated, 'is part of our
law'. . . .[T]he principles governing this case are common to both in-
ternational law and federal common law, which in these circumstances
is necessarily informed both by international law principles and by ar-
ticulated congressional policies."134 This language, and the Court's sub-
sequent citations to U.S. law, British law and an opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice 35 indicate the desire of the Court to integrate
the various sources of law rather than impose a strict hierarchy of ap-
plication. This harkens back to the principle set forth by the Court in
1804 that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains, and conse-
quently, can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect
neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of
nations.
statute. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 422-423.
133. 462 U.S. 611 (1982).
134. Id. at 623, quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
135. Id. at 624-28 and supra notes 22, 26.
136. Alexander Murray, Esq. v. The Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming
Betsy), 6 U.S.(2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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In summary, while various federal district and circuit courts have
actively embraced a hierarchical approach which places customary law
beneath treaties and statutes, the Supreme Court has not specifically
adopted this point of view. In fact, the Supreme Court has reempha-
sized the role of customary international law in recent years. Thus, a
reasonable argument can be made for the proposition that the role of
customary international law in domestic courts remains an issue in dis-
pute; and that a larger role than is presently afforded it may be appro-
priate and more in keeping with original intent. There is, however, one
further issue with regard to American Baptist Churches which must be
addressed.
The court indicated that the aliens who had petitioned for an in-
junction barring their deportation were entitled to a hearing on their
claim of discriminatory application of immigration laws. Whether the
administrative action at issue was a discretionary grant of political asy-
lum or extended voluntary departure, or was a non-discretionary grant
of withholding of deportation, such action is reviewable on equal pro-
tection grounds.1 37 Said the court with regard to the applications for
political asylum and withholding of deportation, "Because the statutory
standards are wholly neutral, however, it is far from certain that the
Attorney General can consider the applicant's nationality in determin-
ing his or her eligibility for relief." 3"
The plaintiffs contend that customary international law requires
the granting of temporary refuge to those seeking to escape widespread
armed conflict in Guatemala and El Salvador. The respondents argue
that the Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to bring the United States
into full compliance with its obligations under international law,139 and
that, therefore, no additional relief is available. If, however, as the
court indicated, the Attorney General may not discriminate in the ap-
plication of immigration laws based on nationality, and if the Refugee
Act did impose an obligation to withhold deportation where the alien
would be subjected to persecution upon return to his country, does this
not in fact constitute a back-door acceptance of the norm of temporary
refuge? If the United Nations protocol from which the Refugee Act
definition of "refugee" derives is accepted as itself a codification of cus-
tomary international law, then the United States has, in fact, adopted
this customary norm both through its accession to the U.N. Protocol
and through its adoption of the Refugee Act. And the American Bap-
137. American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756, 773-
74 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 771.
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tist Churches case reduces to the question of whether the standard used
to apply this definition is in keeping with international custom.
The flaw in this argument is, of course, the fact that those who
qualify as refugees are eligible for a discretionary grant of political
asylum. The withholding of deportation (which is essentially temporary
refuge), as is discussed elsewhere, requires a stronger evidentiary show-
ing (clear probability of deportation) than that for political asylum
(well-founded fear of persecution). 1 0 As was explained earlier, how-
ever, even a discretionary grant is subject to review for discrimination
in application. More to the point, though, this raises the issue of
whether the Refugee Act can be interpreted as consistent with custom-
ary international law. If it can, then political asylum or the withholding
of deportation should be granted. It is incumbent on the court, how-
ever, to determine whether the applicable federal statute can be con-
strued as consistent with a customary norm, not (as the court seems to
have done here) to determine whether the custom can be construed as
consistent with the law.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the role of interna-
tional law in our domestic courts has evolved from a major force at the
time of the Revolution, to a source of law of far more limited applica-
tion. The issue raised by the American Baptist Churches case is
whether the limitations which have come to pass have outstripped the
intentions of the Supreme Court and the requirements of an increas-
ingly interdependent international community.
The court in American Baptist Churches concluded that neither
the Geneva Convention nor customary international law provides a ba-
sis for the plaintiff Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees' request for
temporary refuge. Although the court's holding that a non-self-execut-
ing treaty confers no justiciable rights is reasonable, its conclusion that
customary international law likewise confers no rights in the face of a
conflicting statute is not as firmly grounded in previous case law. A
review of prior Supreme Court cases indicates that while it has spoken
authoritatively on the treaty issue, it has not squarely addressed the
customary international law issue. And in addition, a review of the
early cases leading to The Paquete Habana casts some doubt on the
intentions of the Court with regard to the role of international law.
As increased international trade and international relations be-
come more common in our ever-shrinking world, the role of interna-
140. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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tional law will certainly grow. The hierarchy of application of various
sources of law must be clarified to provide for consistent legal findings.
Therefore, the question presented by the present case is one which
should be definitively addressed by the Supreme Court. A final deter-
mination of this issue must be made both to forestall future confusion
among the lower federal courts and to provide judicial guidance as to
the importance of international law in our domestic courts.
Margaret Hartka

